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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to evaluate the quantity and quality of crisis communication 
efforts during one specific type of public health emergency, beef recalls due to E. 
coli O157:H7 contamination. A content analysis of 452 US newspaper reports within 
30 days of a beef recall was conducted to determine the sources cited and the 
messages communicated to the public. The analysis involved a total of 36 recalls 
issued from 2003 to 2008. The study found the sources cited by reporters include 
two of the major stakeholders involved in the crisis – government agencies and meat 
companies who processed or sold the contaminated product. Messages regarding 
information the public needs to know about the threat were found at a high 
frequency in the coverage. Self-efficacy messages related to how to control or 
manage the threat were less common. Messages communicating measures to 
safeguard against future threat and those that indicate the recall has ended were 
scant, suggesting areas for improvement in crisis communication. Over the six year 
time span, there was only a moderate to slight degree of message consistency. This 
study concludes that the type of media coverage, the sources used, and the 
messages communicated led to the attenuation of risks associated with beef recalls. 
Over all, the findings indicate the importance of maintaining a healthy relationship 
between the food industry and the media, especially during instances that threaten 
public health and well-being. 
 
Keywords: crisis communication, E. coli, food recalls, newspapers, risk 
communication, sources, messages
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Even though the United States is considered to have the safest food 
production and distribution system in the world, there continues to be threats to the 
safety of America’s food supply. One of these threats comes from food-borne 
pathogens such as salmonella, listeria, and E. coli.   
Over the years, the beef industry has received a great deal of attention from 
both the media and consumers due to recalls of products contaminated with E. coli 
O157:H7. The 1993 incident with Jack in the Box restaurants in which hundreds of 
people became ill and several died from eating undercooked contaminated 
hamburgers enhanced the salience of this issue in the minds of the American public. 
Since then, the cases in which E. coli-contaminated ground beef were recalled has 
fluctuated, from a low of 180,000 pounds in 2006 to a high of almost 24 million 
pounds in 2002 (Brasher, 2008). The number of recalls sharply declined by more 
than 80 percent between 2000 and 2006, according to the US Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) (NCBA, 2006). 
However, in 2007, recalls of E. coli-contaminated beef spiked to 2002 levels, with 20 
recalls involving over 30 million pounds of beef (Brasher, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
Table 1. Total number of recalls and approximate pounds of beef recalled, 2003-
2008  
Year Number of recalls Approximate number of pounds recalled 
2003 11 1.88 million 
2004 7 1.2 million 
2005 5 1.2 million 
2006 8 180,000 
2007 20 30 million 
2008 15 7 million 
Source: USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service 
 
Of the pathogens that worry scientists and the general public, Escherichia coli 
is perhaps that most commonly occurring and the most problematic. E. coli O157:H7 
is a pathogen that can be found on any raw food product that has been exposed to 
fecal contamination, but is most commonly associated with ground beef. In October 
1994, FSIS announced that E. coli O157:H7 is an adulterant in raw ground beef due 
to its epidemiological link to the infections caused by the bacteria. Several years 
later, that link was extended to include intact raw beef products. 
E. coli gets into meat products at several stages of animal harvesting and 
beef processing. Raw ground beef products are especially at risk because the 
grinding process spreads the bacteria throughout the ground product. Additionally, 
insufficient cooking methods do not allow the internal temperature of ground beef to 
reach correct levels to kill pathogens. Therefore, eating rare steak does not pose as 
much public health risk because the meat surface where the pathogens thrive is 
cooked at proper temperatures. Hamburgers, however, need to be well done, or 
cooked to an internal temperature of 160 degrees Fahrenheit, in order to effectively 
kill all pathogens.  
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Sporadic incidences of contamination still bedevil the food industry, producing 
headlines that put the integrity of the system into question. When the public is 
alarmed, attention focuses on the issue as well as the extent of government 
regulation to safeguard the public. Ultimately, the public makes the final decision 
when to shy away from beef. Because public opinion has such control over profit, it 
is important for the beef industry to maintain stable ties with consumers.   
 Cognizant of the need to sustain public trust on the beef industry, the 
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) conducted a survey in June 2007 to 
measure consumer awareness of beef recalls. The study was prompted by an 
incident in which a California-based company recalled 5.7 million pounds of E. coli-
contaminated ground beef that caused 14 people to become ill in six states, the 
largest recall in over 18 months (Cohen, 2007). The study concluded that a high 
percentage of consumers are aware of food recalls, with 77 percent of those 
surveyed stating they heard about food recalls in the past three months and 40 
percent saying they were aware of a beef recall. Of highest concern to the 
respondents was food-borne illness due to E. coli (McCarty, 2007). The study 
concluded that such a high level of awareness is largely due to extensive media 
coverage of any food or product recall.   
Study Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the coverage of ground 
beef recalls due to E. coli contamination. It focuses on newspaper reports following a 
recall announcement to evaluate both the sources cited and the crisis 
communication messages they contain. An analysis of the sources cited in this 
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media coverage will ascertain who has played the role of informing the public about 
the crisis and the associated threats to food safety. Furthermore, extracting the 
messages communicated following a recall will shed light on the quality and degree 
of risk communication associated with public health emergencies. A comparison of 
media coverage over a six-year span will determine if changes occurred over time. 
This study offers a unique opportunity to examine many occurrences of the same 
type of crisis situation over an extended period of time to gain a holistic perspective 
on communication practices during food safety crisis events.   
The findings of this study have implications for the management of public 
health crises and risk communication. This thorough investigation of a popular threat 
to public health is expected to inform those responsible for managing food safety 
and those who deal with risk and crisis communication. It is expected that the 
findings will highlight the importance of maintaining connections between the food 
industry and the media, specifically to journalists and reporters who cover food 
safety issues. Because the media are the primary sources of information regarding 
risk and crisis situations, it is essential for organizations to work with journalists to 
ensure that proper messages reach the public.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 This chapter discusses previous literature on the subject of risk and crisis 
communication to provide the study’s conceptual foundations. Next, this chapter 
explains the recall process employed by the United States Department of Agriculture 
Food Safety Inspection Service (USDA FSIS) to initiate a food recall of potentially 
harmful food products. This chapter also discusses the role of public perception of 
risk during crisis situations and on the lessons they provide to crisis communicators. 
The chapter concludes with an outline of the research questions.     
Risk and Crisis Communication 
Nothing is more threatening to the fabric of social life than a crisis of any kind. 
It is perhaps because of this that scholars (e.g., Coombs, 1995; Seeger, 2006; 
Taylor and Kent, 2007) have focused attention on the best methods and practices 
for communicating with the public during times of crisis. Many of these studies have 
identified and explored theoretical formulations and their applicability during crisis 
situations (e.g., Coombs, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2007). Case studies immediately after a 
crisis event have evaluated how communication was handled during specific events 
(e.g., Charlebois and Labrecque, 2007; Christen, 2005; Martinelli and Briggs, 1998; 
Ulmer and Sellnow, 2000). 
 The objective of risk communication is to inform the public about potential 
hazards or dangers that could ultimately cause physical harm or cost lives. When 
risk or crisis communication is not handled properly, the damages they bring can be 
catastrophic. In the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, scientists warning about the 
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imminent collapse of the Louisiana levees were ignored, causing tremendous 
devastation in the wake of a category five hurricane. When the 2004 Asian tsunami 
first hit, efficient information flow and timely communications could have warned 
other countries to take appropriate actions that would have limited the magnitude of 
loss. The lack of transparency in the way British regulatory bodies handled the 1996 
outbreak of mad cow disease caused the situation to be blown out of control. During 
the 1999 West Nile virus outbreak in the eastern United States, the surveillance and 
response structures between public health, veterinary and other scientific 
communities failed to appreciate the connection between outbreaks in birds at the 
Bronx Zoo and human cases (Pate, 2000). Situations like these, and their impact on 
the environment and human life, underscore the need for effective risk and crisis 
communication.  
 A crisis is often an unplanned occurrence that has the ability to negatively 
influence the image of organizations and other stakeholders involved. A crisis is 
often brought about by an unexpected and unpredicted event or a series of such 
events that create great uncertainty that threaten organizational or social goals 
(Ulmer and Sellnow, 2000). Coombs (1995) defines crises as negative events that 
“can pollute the positive aspects of an organization’s image” (p. 448). A crisis often 
causes changes in the condition, processes, or structure of an organization or 
industry that results in tacit defense mechanisms (Charlebois and Labrecque, 2007). 
The Crisis Response Project (Boone, et al., 2006) sponsored by several 
organizations, including the USDA and the National Center for Food Protection and 
Defense, defines a crisis as “an event or series of events characterized by threats to 
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important goals, short response time, and surprise. It is a decisive moment of 
intervention where change must occur or the organization (or persons) involved may 
not survive” (p. 65). The adverse effects of a crisis include reduced sales, loss of 
market share, and negative public perception (Coombs, 2007). 
 Crises are categorized based on their causal factors and the locus of their 
control. Thus, Coombs (1995) proposes that a typology of crises can be developed 
by situating a crisis event on a matrix based on two criteria: (1) whether the causal 
factor is internal or external to the affected organization, and (2) whether it was 
intentionally or unintentionally caused. These two criteria have a bearing on how the 
crisis can be managed or controlled. A crisis internal to the organization and 
unintentionally caused by some actor(s) is considered more controllable (Table 2).  
Table 2. Examples of crises based on causal factors and intent (adapted from 
Coombs, 1995) 
 
Events such as protests and boycotts instigated by interest groups are 
externally spawned crises induced by retaliations against an organization’s policies. 
Terrorist activities that aim to reduce sales or disrupt production processes can also 
be considered as externally induced crises triggered by negative reactions to 
perceived discordant policies. Examples of these include product tampering, 
hostage taking, instances of workplace violence, or sabotage. Actors within an 
organization can knowingly cause harm or subject people to risk thereby prompting 
 Internal actors and 
actions External actors and actions 
Intentional Transgressions Terrorism 
Unintentional Accidents Faux pas 
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negative public reaction. These include intentionally selling defective or dangerous 
products, violating safety laws, or withholding safety information from authorities. 
According to Coombs (2007), a factor that has contributed to most crisis situations 
so far is accidents—unintentional events that occur due to forces of nature (e.g., 
natural disasters or calamities and epidemics) or from human error (e.g., industrial 
accidents and other mishaps that lead to product recalls). The current study 
examines this latter type of crises; accidents caused by unintentional, internal 
actions from human errors that trigger public outcry for reforms.  
Reynolds and Seeger (2005) define public health emergencies as those that 
create risk to the general public health needing a “significant communication 
component in the form of warnings, risk messages, evacuation notifications, 
messages regarding self-efficacy, information regarding symptoms and medical 
treatment, among others” (p. 44). Ground beef contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 
falls under this category of public health emergencies.  
 The food industry is a sector of society that is prone to crisis. Perhaps the 
most salient in people’s minds are the sporadic food safety threats they have 
experienced so far, such as the recall of contaminated beef patties, spinach and 
peanut butter that have cost lives, and the public scare produced by what is more 
commonly known as mad cow disease. Events that threaten the safety of the food 
supply have long-term effects on the level of trust consumers have in food 
producers, handlers, marketers, and regulatory bodies (Charlebois and Labrecque, 
2007). A study that examined a crisis situation involving E. coli contamination of 
apple juice in 1996 (Thomsen and Rawson, 1998) showed that the public perceived 
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the producer, the California-based juice maker Odwalla, “as a threat to the health 
and lives of its customers” (p. 37). In the case of the 2006 spinach recall due to E. 
coli contamination, ten percent of the respondents of a Rutgers University study said 
they were “unlikely” or “definitely will not eat” spinach in the future (Cuite et al., 2007) 
as a consequence. The study also showed that the recall caused people to stop 
purchasing other bagged produce.   
 Public perception of the safety of the nation’s beef supply slumped following 
the threat of an outbreak of mad cow disease in the United States in 2003. Studying 
this incident, Hallman, Schilling, and Turvey (2004) found that 24 percent of their 
national sample who were aware of this threat believed the country’s beef supply 
was unsafe. Another 19.5 percent said they had reduced their consumption of beef 
as a result. About four percent stopped eating beef altogether.  
It is clear, therefore, that a series of these types of incidents can erode public 
confidence in the safety of the American food supply. Indeed, a study by McCarty 
(2007) shows that consumers already think their risk of suffering from food-borne 
illness is increasing. Thus, monitoring public perception and opinion prior to, during 
and after a crisis is an important component of crisis communication (Seeger, 2006). 
Food Recalls 
 In the US, meat, poultry, and egg products are inspected and regulated by the 
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) to guarantee that these products 
are safe, wholesome, and accurately labeled. All other food products are examined 
and regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Food recalls entail 
removing food products considered to be adulterated, misbranded or contaminated 
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from the market. These are voluntary actions taken by the manufacturer or 
distributor to prevent potential health problems, illnesses or deaths. When the FSIS 
identifies a potential food safety risk, a Recall Committee requests the company 
responsible for the product to recall the product in question, and determines how the 
recall should be classified (USDA FSIS, 2006). Individual companies can also initiate 
voluntary recalls of their own products.    
Recalls are classified based on their potential to cause harm to human health. 
A Class III recall, the least threatening, indicates minimal adverse health 
consequences from eating the food product. A Class II recall means there is a 
distant chance of adverse health effects. The most severe recall, Class I, suggests a 
reasonable probability for major health problems, including death. Beef recalls due 
to E. coli contamination fall under a Class I recall.   
 A recall is initiated when the FSIS notifies the public through press and 
electronic releases to media outlets about a potential threat and its identified 
geographic scope. The press releases are also posted on the FSIS website, 
www.fsis.usda.gov/Fsis_Recalls/, where the public can check the status of recalls 
and search for related information. 
Public Perception of Risk 
 Cognizant of the potential internal and external threats crises pose to an 
organization’s integrity, crisis managers have identified appropriate response 
strategies. These strategies are more effective when they are based on 
communication theory. Several of these theories have the ability to predict public 
response to communication efforts in situations that offer significant threat to the 
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environment and human life. Among them is attribution theory (Coombs, 2007, 
Coombs and Holiday, 2004).  
Attribution theory suggests that people have the tendency to assign blame or 
have a need to determine responsibility for crisis events (Coombs, 2007). In crisis 
situations, affected organizations may employ any one of four potential response 
strategies: denial, forced compliance, voluntary compliance, or they may exert 
extraordinary efforts to remedy the situation and minimize the damage.  
The social amplification of risk theory posits that risk situations are amplified 
or attenuated by societal forces (Kasperson et al., 1988; Burns et al., 1993; 
Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996). Risks that are considered reasonably slight can 
be augmented to create strong public concern and negative societal and economic 
impacts. The social amplification of risk theory suggests that public responses to a 
risk or a risk event are affected by psychological, social, institutional, and cultural 
factors and how these factors interact. According to Kasperson et al. (1988), risk 
events can be amplified or attenuated by the quantity and quality of information 
about the risk communicated to the public. The significance of the event, perceived 
risk, amount of media coverage, and public reaction directly relate to the degree to 
which the public considers the risk situation as threatening, and their perceived 
vulnerability to the risk (Burns et al., 1993). In other words, the degree to which the 
media cover the risk event and the quality of the messages conveyed can influence 
the nature and level of public response.     
Risk communication scholars have long understood that people base their 
assessments of a given risk not just on probability of harm as evaluated by scientists 
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and other risk experts. Sandman (2003), for example, defines risk as a combination 
of hazard and outrage (risk = hazard + outrage). Hazard refers to the technical 
element of the risk—the likelihood and scale of the risk as evaluated by experts. 
Outrage is the normative component of risk, including how people apply social 
values, the level of trust they hold about government and other regulatory bodies, 
their psychological predispositions about the risk, and the extent to which they 
perceive themselves as able to control or guard against a threatening situation. In 
the case of crisis situations, hazard and outrage are high, causing intense public fear 
due to a perceived great potential for physical harm (Sandman, 2003). Therefore, in 
order to improve public trust in strategic communications, crisis or risk 
communicators need to realize that individuals assess risk through technical and 
normative approaches (Rodriguez and Lee, 2005). 
 Outrage, which constitutes the normative or psychological dimension of risk 
perception, changes depending on the type of risk (Sandman and Lanard, 2003). 
“Outrage includes emotions such as fear, anger, and extreme concern.” These 
reactions are heightened depending on the extent to which the public sees their 
exposure to the risk as voluntary or involuntary, whether the risk is scientifically 
known or well understood, or perceived as an act of God or an act of humans, 
among others” (Sandman, 2003 as cited in Rodriguez and Lee, 2005, p. 7). Social 
values and trust also play a role in how the public perceives risk, according to Slovic 
(1997). In his view, the public’s risk assessment is as affected by complex 
psychographic factors such as emotions, beliefs, and philosophies as information 
regarding scientific assessments of probabilities of harm. 
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In an effort to help organizations and communicators establish a plan to 
communicate to the public during times of crisis, several scholars and experts have 
developed lists for best practices for crisis communication (e.g. Seeger, 2006; Hyer 
and Covella, 2005; Boone, et. al., 2006). One of the steps within these best 
practices is to develop appropriate messages to communicate to the public. Seeger 
(2006) recommends these messages include an element of self-efficacy. Examples 
of those messages are actions recommended for the public to take include avoiding 
particular food products, practicing proper food handling techniques, availing of 
medical treatment, or identifying possible symptoms to be able to take advantage of 
proper medical response. The World Health Organization (Hyer and Covella, 2005) 
recommends that during public health emergencies, messages should encourage 
public dialog, enable the public by proposing preventative actions, assist them in 
identifying symptoms, and telling them where to find additional information.  
 It is an established fact that the public learns about a risky situation first 
through their exposure to mass media messages (Marks, et al., 2007; McComas, 
2006; Reynolds and Seeger, 2005; and Coleman, 1993). Therefore, how the media 
portray a crisis plays an important role in managing risks. The media may frame 
risks by attributing blame, evaluating government responses, and offering expert 
perspectives, among others (Littlefield and Quenette, 2007). The stakeholders of a 
crisis situation need to be cognizant of how the media depict the situation and tell 
the story because these portrayals influence public opinion and mitigate public 
reaction. In the case of beef recalls, a major stakeholder is the beef industry 
represented by the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA). Aside from beef 
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consumers, there are other stakeholders affected by these beef recalls. These 
include the slaughter or processing plants from which the contaminated product 
originated (Consumer Reports, 2008). Additional stakeholders are those responsible 
for regulating and managing the threat, including federal and state government 
agencies such as the USDA FSIS and the departments of health and human 
services. An important stakeholder, of course, is beef consumers.   
Research Questions 
This study focuses on the quality and quantity of information communicated to 
the public and the sources of that information during beef recalls. This study 
evaluates the extent to which the stakeholders involved when beef gets recalled are 
cited. The objective is to determine how risk communication messages were 
communicated to the public through the media to evaluate the coverage of a public 
health crisis situation. 
From the review of literature above, the following research questions are 
posed: 
 RQ1:  What are the sources cited in newspaper reports of E. coli-related beef 
recalls?  
 RQ2: What messages inform the public about the crisis or threat? 
 RQ3: What messages inform the public about how to control or manage the 
risk? 
 RQ4: What messages communicate measures to safeguard against future 
risk or threat? 
 RQ5: What messages indicate that the current crisis has ended? 
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 RQ6: Was there a change in reporting of the above messages over time?  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 The intention of this study is to identify how the media covered crisis 
situations regarding recalls of E. coli O157:H7-contaminated beef. Over the last two 
decades, millions of pounds of beef were recalled from the market due to food-borne 
pathogens. This study aims to analyze newspaper coverage immediately following 
the announcement of a beef recall due to E. coli contamination with a three-fold 
purpose: 1) to identify the sources cited to determine the extent to which the 
identified stakeholders are involved in crisis communication, 2) to extract the 
messages communicated to the public that will assist them in controlling, managing, 
and preventing the threat, and 3) to ascertain whether the extent to which these 
messages were communicated changed over time. The overall objective is to draw 
from the findings recommendations on how to improve future food industry crisis 
communication efforts. 
Study Design 
The method used to gather data is a content analysis of news reports. The 
population for this study was composed of newspaper articles that discussed beef 
recalls specifically due to E. coli O157:H7 contamination. The entire newspaper 
article was the unit of analysis. The timeframe of this study covers the past six years, 
from 2003 through 2008, because this duration enables a critical examination of the 
most recent incidences of beef recalls with major implications about the extent to 
which food-borne pathogens pose risk to the country’s food supply. The articles 
analyzed were published within the first 30 days after a recall was announced.  
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The search engine Lexis-Nexis was used to collect newspaper articles 
containing the terms “recall,” “E. coli” and “beef.” Articles were collected from 
national, regional and local newspapers across the United States. A sampling 
technique was not applied for the majority of the recalls as the number of articles 
retrieved was of a reasonable number to conduct a census of the entire population. 
For recalls yielding more than 50 news articles, without duplicates of the same story, 
a composite random sampling technique was applied, in which there are three 
cases. Duplicate articles and stories that discussed the topics only tangentially were 
not included in the analysis.  
A list of E. coli-related beef recalls was obtained from the USDA FSIS 
website. Recalls of more than 10,000 pounds of beef were selected for this study. 
This threshold in terms of number of pounds associated with each recall was 
deemed appropriate to elicit a significant media response. 
Arriving at the sample 
Using this study design, a total of 36 recalls issued from 2003 to 2008 was 
the subject of the 452 newspaper articles that were analyzed. Table 3 describes the 
study population based on the recall, number of pounds recalled, and associated 
number of articles collected. The news reports were collected from both national 
newspapers (48%) and regional newspapers (52%). Of the sample, 83 percent (n = 
373) were straight news reports, and 14 percent (n = 65) were categorized as press 
releases. The remainder of the sample was made up of 13 editorials (3%) and only 
one feature article.   
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Table 3. Study population by recall and corresponding newspaper coverage 
Date of recall 
announcement 
Pounds 
recalled 
Number of days of 
coverage 
Number of 
newspaper 
reports analyzed 
Total number of 
newspaper reports 
(Includes duplicates) 
     
2003 totals – 6 recalls 1,930,900 Average – 5.3 42 67 
March 11, 2003 160,000 6 11 16 
June 29, 2003 239,000 9 13 23 
August 5, 2003 194,700 7 8 11 
August 8, 2003 659,000 2 2 3 
August 23, 2003 76,000 2 4 8 
October 31, 2003 102,200 6 4 6 
     
2004 totals – 6 recalls 1,198,600 Average – 2.5 32 78 
February 24, 2004 90,000 2 3 7 
April 29, 2004 45,000 2 4 15 
June 22, 2004 101,600 1 1 2 
August 03, 2004 497,000 3 18 36 
August 20, 2004 406,000 3 2 2 
September 17, 2004 59,000 4 4 16 
     
2005 totals – 4 recalls 1,242,250 Average – 4 22 48 
June 9, 2005 63,850 3 5 15 
August 22, 2005 900,000 8 7 13 
September 23, 2005 184,000 11 6 7 
November 1, 2005 94,400 2 4 13 
     
2006 totals – 2 recalls 169,313 Average – 1 3 4 
May 5, 2006 156,235 1 2 3 
August 4, 2006 13,078 1 1 1 
     
2007 totals – 10 recalls 30,037,160 Average – 15.4 223 846 
March 2, 2007 16,743 5 8 12 
April 20, 2007 107,943 10 11 18 
May 10, 2007 117,500 6 9 13 
May 11, 2007 129,000 10 6 15 
June 3, 2007 5,700,000 13 50 133 
June 8, 2007 40,440 27 9 17 
July 21, 2007 26,669 10 5 9 
September 25, 2007 21,700,000 37 50 404 
October 6, 2007 845,000 12 29 63 
October 13, 2007 173,554 10 2 2 
November 3, 2007 1,084,384 9 36 124 
November 24, 2007 95,927 5 8 36 
     
2008 totals – 8 recalls 6,957,185 Average – 12.1 130 119 
January 5, 2008 13,150 3 2 3 
January 12, 2008 188,000 10 12 18 
May 8, 2008 68,670 1 1 3 
June 8, 2008 13,275 13 2 3 
June 25, 2008 5,300,000 36 50 120 
August 6, 2008 153,630 5 15 18 
August 8, 2008 1,200,000 28 47 99 
October 8, 2008 20,460 1 1 2 
Grand totals – 36 recalls 14,135,408 Average – 6.7 452 reports 1162 
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Operational Definition of Variables 
  The first five sources of information cited in the newspaper articles were 
coded. These sources may be individuals, agencies, organizations, and institutions. 
Identifying the source attributions will help verify the extent to which the media uses 
stakeholders as information sources during crisis situations, and what other sources 
are framing the beef recall incidents to the public. The sources were categorized as 
follows (adapted from De Guzman, 2008): 
1. Scientists from universities and university-based research institutions 
(scientists from a university with a food safety program); 
2. Governmental scientists (e.g., scientists from the Food and Drug 
Administration, Centers for Disease Control, or USDA); 
3. Other scientists (scientists from institutions other than those mentioned 
above); 
4. Scientific journals and journal editors; 
5. Meat sellers (e.g., meat packers, meat retailers, meat wholesalers, grocery 
stores); 
6. Ordinary citizens and consumers, but not farmers (e.g., individual consumers, 
restaurant personnel); 
7. Advocacy groups (e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Center for 
Science in the Public Interest); 
8. International not-for-profit groups; 
9. Government agencies, employees, but not government scientist (e.g., USDA, 
FSIS, CDC, spokesperson for government agency who is not a scientist); 
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10. Industry organizations (e.g., the American Meat Institute); 
11. Beef representatives (e.g., National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, state beef 
associations, Cattlemen’s Beef Board, state beef councils); 
12. Politicians and elected officials (e.g., senators, elected representatives) 
13. Other (all other sources not listed above, including lawyers, religious leaders, 
websites, surveys and public opinion polls). 
Specific messages were coded as either present or not present in each 
article. These messages, culled from risk communication literature as items that 
assist the public through risk situations, are as follows: 
RQ2: Messages informing the public about the crisis or threat:  
1. The history of recalls 
2. The number of pounds recalled 
3. The name of the company or companies involved in the recall 
4. The type of product recalled (i.e., product codes, description of product) 
5. The date the recall was announced 
6. The dates the recalled product was processed or distributed (i.e., sell-by 
dates, processed-on dates) 
7. Where the product was distributed, such as affected states and stores 
8. Information about the pathogen (i.e., bacteria, causes of the food-borne 
illness, and other science-based information) 
RQ3: Messages informing the public how to control or manage the risk or threat:  
1. Messages about safe food preparation 
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2. The illnesses and symptoms of E. coli infection, including number of 
people who have become sick or died as a result of consuming the 
contaminated product 
3. Messages informing consumers what to do if they purchased a recalled 
product (i.e., check if they purchased the product, return the product, 
throw the product away) 
4. An indication of how much of the product has been returned or accounted 
for, including methods to track recalled products 
5. Messages instructing people how to report cases of illness 
6. Contact information of companies or agencies from where consumers can 
get more information. 
RQ4: Messages that communicate measures to safeguard against future risks or 
threats: 
1. Description or indication of how contamination was discovered 
2. Messages that ensure the beef supply is safe 
3. Changes to governmental regulations or processor practices that aim to 
prevent future outbreaks 
4. Actions taken by the beef industry to prevent future outbreaks 
RQ5: Messages indicating that the current crisis has ended: 
1. The date when the recall has officially terminated. 
 
 
 
 22 
Additional variables that were coded include the following: 
1. The type of story (whether it is a straight news report, a feature article, an 
editorial piece, or a letter to the editor or publication).   
2. The origin of the story (whether the story was written by a newspaper reporter 
or staff member, came from a wire service, written by a reader in response to 
a published article or as a letter to the editor, or from other sources). 
3. The headline of the story.  
4. The date when the story was published.   
5. The length of the story in number of words.    
Inter-coder Reliability 
 To achieve acceptable inter-coder reliability, a pre-test of the newspaper 
coding scheme was conducted to ensure the validity and accuracy of values and 
protocols. Two graduate students were trained on the coding procedures. The 
newspaper articles were systematically numbered, and ten percent of the retrieved 
articles were randomly selected and made up a sub-sample that was coded to test 
for inter-coder reliability. The inter-coder reliability for nominal variables was 
calculated using Holsti’s formula in which reliability equals two times the number of 
agreement between the two coders divided by the total number of coding decisions 
of the coders. Table 4 provides a summary of the inter-coder reliability test. 
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Table 4. Summary of inter-coder reliability test 
Variables Inter-coder reliability 
Type 1.00 
Origin 0.91 
Category 1.00 
Messages informing about threat  
 History of recalls 0.82 
 Pounds recalled 0.91 
 Name of company 1.00 
 Type of recalled product 0.68 
 Date recall announced 0.64 
 Dates product processed 0.95 
 Where product was distributed 0.82 
 Information about the product 0.64 
  
Messages informing how to control or  
manage the threat 
 
 Safe food preparation 0.91 
 Symptoms and illnesses 0.95 
 What do to with the purchased product 0.86 
How much of recalled product was            
accounted for 
1.00 
 How to report illness 0.91 
 Company contact information 0.91 
  
Messages about measures to safeguard  
against future threat 
 
 How contamination was discovered 0.64 
 Assurances that beef supply is safe 0.95 
 Changes to regulatory procedures  1.00 
 Preventing measures specifically from the 
 beef industry  
1.00 
  
Messages indicating the threat has ended  
 Threat is over 1.00 
 No indication 1.00 
 
Data Analysis 
This study made use of descriptive statistics to answer the six research 
questions. To respond to RQ 1, the frequency distributions of sources by categories 
were analyzed. To answer RQ2, RQ3, RQ4, and RQ5 the messages were coded as 
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either present or not present in each of the newspaper reports. The frequency 
distributions of messages during the six-year coverage were analyzed to answer 
RQ6.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 This study examines US newspaper coverage of beef recalls due to E. coli 
contamination over a six-year period. It aims to determine 1) the sources cited in the 
newspaper reports, 2) the messages communicated to the public about the crisis or 
threat, 3) the messages that informed audiences how to control or manage the risk, 
4) the messages that provided measures to safeguard the public against future risks 
or threats, and the 5) messages that indicated that the current crisis has ended, 
Additionally, the study sought 6) to determine the extent to which these messages 
changed over time. The sample population for this study is 452 national and regional 
newspaper reports within 30 days of a beef recall. The analysis involved a total of 36 
recalls issued from 2003 to 2008.  
Sources Cited  
 An analysis of the sources used in the newspaper reports revealed a small 
number of sources cited per article and a limited number of types of sources 
referenced across the study timeframe. The average number of sources cited per 
article was 2.35; six percent of the articles (27) did not cite any source at all. Only 
14.4 percent or 65 news reports named at least five sources. That reporters turn to a 
small number of people, organizations or agencies for information during these 
events suggests the need for communication practitioners within these groups who 
are equipped to specifically handle these crisis situations.    
An overwhelming majority of the sources were from two categories—
government agencies and meat sellers—that were consistently identified among the 
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first five sources coded for each news report. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the 
categories of sources cited.  
 
Figure 1. Frequency of types of sources cited in newspaper coverage (totals of the 
first five sources coded for each news report) 
 
Non-scientist sources from government agencies such as the USDA, FSIS, 
and federal, state, and county departments of health and human services, were the 
most frequently cited. Government agencies were the leading source, cited in news 
reports 463 times. This category includes government spokespeople, directors, and 
officials from all levels. Of the agencies comprising this category, the USDA and the 
FSIS were cited 253 times, the most often cited source throughout the study period.  
The second most frequently cited source came from the category of meat 
sellers, companies where the recalled product may have been produced or sold, 
including meat packers, wholesalers, retailers, and grocery stores. The meat sellers 
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category received a total of 376 cites in the newspaper reports. These sources 
involve companies and stores that either produced or sold the recalled meat and 
their spokespersons, presidents, or representatives. 
Although named only in 37 instances, lawyers, categorized as “other” 
sources, were cited as a source. The most often cited was an attorney who has 
made a name for himself representing victims of food safety related cases, including 
E. coli contamination. He writes his own press releases and was often quoted by 
reporters in the coverage of more significant recalls involving sizeable amounts of 
beef or a high number of associated illness. In general, lawyers were quoted to 
demonstrate the suffering of victims or as calling for changes to prevent future food 
safety calamities.  
Elected officials played a smaller role as sources of information with a 
majority of them calling for changes to government regulatory procedures for 
handling recalls. References to elected officials increased in frequency the longer 
the recall remained in the media spotlight.  
Perhaps more surprising is the finding that beef organizations were cited only 
five times over the six-year period of coverage. These sources, each cited only 
once, were the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), the Minnesota Beef 
Council, the Nebraska Cattlemen, the Nebraska Beef Council, and the California 
Cattlemen’s Association. The NCBA was quoted from its own press release issued 
during the June 3, 2007 recall of 5.7 million pounds of beef. The information it 
provided was not picked up in subsequent coverage of that recall.  
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The American Meat Institute, a national trade association representing meat 
and poultry companies and suppliers in the US, was cited a total of 14 times. It was 
categorized as an industry organization because it is separate and independent from 
meat sellers and other beef organizations. The Institute figured in reports issued in 
2007 and 2008, which saw a spike in the number of recalls and number of pounds 
recalled.   
The findings reveal a limited category of sources newspapers rely on for 
information regarding these sporadic public health threats. However, those who are 
expected to communicate to the public during these crisis events, namely the 
government agencies and the meat sellers, were well represented. It is clear, 
therefore, that the media rely on these stakeholders for information the public needs 
to limit their risk.  
A significant factor that mitigates public perception of risk is level of trust, 
especially on institutions legally mandated to assist in crisis events. When the public 
perceives an organization or agency to be trustworthy, risk perception can be 
attenuated (Slovic, 1993). This theory holds true for the media as well. Reporters are 
more likely to turn to a trusted source for information about a crisis situation. The 
USDA and the FSIS were found to be the leading sources of information on matters 
related to beef recalls due perhaps to the high level of trust they enjoy among media 
practitioners (Family Food Information Program, 2007; Zehr, 2003). Reporters turn 
to them for information in the belief that the public is more likely to heed risk 
messages from these trusted sources.  
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Attribution theory, the need for the public to assign blame, may explain why 
meat sellers were the second most frequently cited sources in the newspaper 
articles. One of the four crisis response strategies of an affected organization under 
attribution theory is to exert extraordinary efforts to remedy the situation and 
minimize the damage (Coombs, 2007). The companies that produced or sold the 
contaminated beef were more likely to be blamed during these crisis situations. That 
they are always open and accessible to the media during these events indicate their 
sense of accountability and their proactive stance to limit public outrage. Their 
presence and importance as a source becomes more evident in the messages that 
are communicated, which are described next.   
Messages that Inform About the Crisis or Threat 
  The messages that announce a beef recall and inform consumers of what 
they need to be aware of are well communicated in the articles collected. All pre-
identified messages about the threat of E. coli were found. These messages were 
the most often communicated, with a total of 2,087 messages representing this 
category. Table 5 lists the frequency with which these messages were mentioned in 
the news reports.  
The Food and Drug Administration provides an E. coli O157:H7 model press 
release and an example that companies can access to provide guidance for 
information that is required when notifying the public of a product recall (see 
Appendix B). Additionally, the FDA Office of Regulatory Affairs/Office of 
Enforcement has available a “Guidance for Industry” for product recalls detailing 
instructions and counsel for handling a product recall. The guidance includes 
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information for how to make a recall submission to the FDA, proper public 
notification, and evaluation of the recall. This document is accessible at 
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/recalls/recallpg.html.  
 
Table 5. Frequency of messages informing the public about the threat 
Messages Frequency Percentage 
History of recalls 83 18.3 
Pounds recalled 389 85.9 
Company name given 441 97.4 
Type of product recalled 250 55.2 
Date recall announced 190 41.9 
Dates product processed 317 70.0 
Where product distributed 323 71.3 
Information about pathogen 94 20.8 
 
In over 97 percent of the news reports, the company involved in the recall and 
in 86 percent, the number of pounds recalled was listed. At least 70 percent of the 
time, the public was informed of where the recalled product was distributed, the 
dates the product was processed or the sell-by/freeze-by dates. Also, descriptions of 
the recalled product were communicated in 55 percent of the articles. Messages that 
told about when the recall was announced were found in 40 percent of the articles, 
and messages that provided information about the pathogen were found in 20 
percent of the stories. Messages about the company’s history of recalls were the 
least frequent content item at just above 18 percent. 
Most of this information originated from either the USDA FSIS or the meat 
company itself. Typically, when the FSIS notifies the public of a recall, the press 
release often contains information about the date the recall was announced, the 
company involved, the number of pounds recalled, product descriptions, process 
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dates, an indication of why the recall was issued, illnesses and symptoms 
associated with consuming a contaminated product, and safe food preparation 
techniques. The FSIS issues a press release with these information items for each 
recall, which explains why these types of messages were most common and why 
the Service was the most often cited source. Information regarding where the 
product was distributed and the history of recalls generally came from meat 
companies. In many cases, they appeared to be verifying information provided by 
the FSIS.  
Crisis communication must be principally informative with messages 
concerning the current state or conditions related to a specific event and the 
magnitude of the event (Reynolds and Seeger, 2005). Messages informing people 
about E. coli-related threats could be classified under this description. The high 
volume of these messages provides evidence that effective crisis communication is 
occurring for these cases.  
Messages that Inform the Public How to Control or Manage the Risk or Threat 
 Messages that inform the public how to control or manage the risk associated 
with E. coli-contaminated beef were moderately prevalent in the newspaper reports 
examined. A total of 847 such messages were present. The frequency of occurrence 
of such messages is presented in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
Table 6. Frequency of messages informing the public how to control or manage the 
threat 
Messages Frequency Percentage 
Safe food preparation practices 125 27.6 
Symptoms and illnesses 351 77.5 
What do to in case product was 
purchased 
154 34.0 
How much of contaminated product was 
accounted for 
49 10.8 
How to report illness 28 6.2 
Contact information 140 30.9 
 
 The overwhelming majority of messages regarding how to control or manage 
the threat relates to symptoms and illnesses associated with E. coli. Over three-
quarters of the articles told the public the symptoms and signs of illness associated 
with ingesting food contaminated with this pathogen and/or the number of people 
who became ill or died as a result of eating contaminated products. Statements 
informing consumers what they should do if they purchased the recalled product 
were found in 34 percent of the articles. In addition, the contact information of 
companies or agencies consumers can contact to get more information about the 
recalled product was provided in one-third of the articles. Approximately 27 percent 
of the articles included messages on safe food handling procedures, most of which 
told consumers to cook meat to 160 degrees Fahrenheit. Messages on how much of 
the recalled product has been accounted for by the company or by the USDA FSIS, 
and information on how consumers can report illnesses potentially associated with 
the contaminated product were found in 10.8 percent and 6.2 percent of the articles, 
respectively. 
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The objective of risk communication is to inform the public about potential 
hazards or dangers that could ultimately cause physical harm or cost lives. The 
outrage dimension of public risk perception includes the extent to which the public 
perceives it can control or be protected against the threat (Sandman, 2003). These 
messages of self-efficacy regarding the signs and symptoms of illness, and the 
number of cases involved suggest an effort in achieving appropriate risk and crisis 
communication practices (Seeger, 2006; Hyer and Covello, 2005). 
However, there is a low frequency of messages on what consumers should 
do with the recalled product and on safe food handling procedures. This perhaps 
points to a need for more effective ways of improving the transmission of “how-to” 
information and more clear calls for action. Information items such as how to cook 
meat properly, returning or throwing away contaminated products, or calling grocery 
stores and other retail outlets to find out if they sold the recalled product, are actions 
the public can readily take to reduce risk. When the public perceives a risk as 
controllable and voluntary, their outrage factors and risk perception are assuaged 
(Sandman, 2003).  
 One message occurring at a fairly high frequency was the contact information 
of companies involved in the recall. Often, the public was given the name of 
someone in the company and a phone number to contact if they had questions 
about the recall. By providing this important information, the companies were being 
open to and sensitive to public concerns (Seeger, 2006; Hyer and Covello, 2005). 
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Messages that Communicate Measures to Safeguard Against  
Future Risks or Threats 
 This third group of messages, those that communicate measures to 
safeguard against future contamination, is less frequent, accounting for 298 of the 
total messages communicated. Table 7 lists the frequency of occurrence of such 
messages. 
Table 7. Frequency of messages about measures to safeguard against future threat 
Messages Frequency Percentage 
How contamination was discovered 182 40.2 
Assurance that beef supply is safe 35 7.7 
Changes to regulatory policies 78 17.2 
Beef industry prevention actions 3 0.7 
 
 About 40 percent of the articles discussed how the contamination was 
discovered. These generally included items such as the results of routine testing for 
E. coli by meat processors or the epidemiology that links tainted meat to illnesses. 
Changes to regulations to prevent future outbreaks were found in 17.2 percent of the 
articles. Messages that assure that the beef supply is safe or attempts by the beef 
industry to prevent further contamination were almost non-existent, found in only 7.7 
and 0.7 percent, respectively, of the articles examined. 
 Articles that talked about measures to safeguard against future threats were 
relatively low, indicating a risk communication area that can stand major 
improvement. What is surprising is the almost complete lack of messages from the 
beef industry along these lines. As one of the major stakeholders in these situations, 
the industry was relative silent about their preventive measures. Even when the 
contaminated beef was found responsible for illnesses and death, messages of 
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reassurance were not found. Of the 7.7 percent of the messages regarding the 
safety of the beef supply, a majority came from U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ed 
Shafer during the June 25, 2008 recall of 5.3 million pounds of beef. During this 
recall, the USDA was criticized for delaying the announcement, leading to higher 
cases of illness, and suggesting flaws in the recall process. Secretary Shafer 
countered that criticism by supporting the USDA’s actions in the recall and 
articulating a need to review the process in the future.   
Messages that Indicate the Crisis has Ended 
 Messages that inform the public whether the recall or threat has ended were 
almost non-existent. Only three articles reported on this item. Those three articles 
were associated with only two recalls: two articles were printed four days after an 
April 20, 2007 recall and another article published six days after an October 6, 2007 
recall. Table 8 summarizes these findings. 
Table 8. Frequency of messages indicating the threat has ended 
Messages Frequency Percentage 
Threat is over 3 0.7 
No indication 449 99.3 
 
 Why this is the case is difficult to discern. It may be because E. coli 
contamination can occur at any time without any prior notice or warning. As such, it 
is best for the public to continue to be vigilant of this recurring risk so they maintain 
proper food safety habits. However, notifying the public that a recall has ended might 
encourage consumers to purchase beef once again if they avoided it during the 
recall. At the very least, companies involved in a recall must notify the USDA FSIS 
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and everyone within the company when the recall is over. Clearly, this question 
warrants further exploration.  
Change in Reporting of Messages over Time 
An evaluation of the change in communicating messages over time reveals 
sporadic patterns in terms of the frequency of specific messages about the risks 
involved in beef recalls. This analysis discloses the richness of information that is 
communicated from year to year. The percentages of messages by year are detailed 
in Table 9.  
Table 9. Percentages of messages in newspaper reports by year 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Messages about the threat 
      
History of recalls 16.7 28.1 22.7 0.0 16.1 20.0 
Pounds recalled 97.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 90.2 68.5 
Name of company involved in recall 97.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.0 98.5 
Type of product recalled 92.9 93.8 100.0 66.7 48.2 37.7 
Date recall was announced 33.3 46.9 27.3 33.3 40.6 48.5 
Dates product was processed or 
distributed 
85.7 87.5 68.2 33.3 65.2 70.0 
Where product was distributed 83.3 87.5 54.5 100.0 68.8 70.0 
Information about the pathogen 54.8 71.9 18.2 0.0 14.7 8.5 
Average percentage 70.3 77.0 61.3 54.2 55.0 52.7 
       
Messages about how to control or 
manage the threat 
      
Safe food preparation practices 19.0 28.1 22.7 0.0 27.7 31.5 
Illnesses and symptoms 78.6 65.6 59.1 33.3 81.7 76.9 
What to do in case recalled product was 
purchased 
33.3 31.3 27.3 0.0 37.9 30.0 
How much recalled product  
accounted for 
4.8 3.1 0.0 33.3 14.3 10.0 
How to report cases or illness 14.3 3.1 4.5 0.0 4.9 6.9 
Contact information for companies or 
agencies 
47.6 37.5 45.5 0.0 30.4 23.1 
Average percentage 32.9 28.1 26.5 27.8 32.8 29.7 
       
Messages on safeguard measures for 
future threats 
      
How contamination was discovered 52.4 28.1 18.2 33.3 42.0 40.0 
Assurances that beef supply is safe 4.8 0.0 0.0 33.3 6.3 13.8 
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Table 9. (continued)       
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Messages on safeguard measures for 
future threats 
      
Changes to regulatory policies 2.4 12.5 4.5 0.0 24.1 13.8 
Beef industry prevention measures 2.4 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Average percentage 15.5 10.9 5.7 16.7 18.2 16.9 
       
Messages that the threat has ended       
No indication at all 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.7 100.0 
Threat has ended 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 
 
The greatest percent of messages communicated information about the threat 
of E. coli. However, there is a gradual decline in the frequency of these messages 
from 2003 to 2008. Especially noticeable is a decrease in the number of information 
about the pathogen. In 2003 and 2004, science information about E. coli was 
prevalent in about 55 percent and 72 percent of the articles, respectively. Those 
percentages sharply declined to 18.2 percent in 2005, 16.5 percent in 2007, and 8.5 
percent in 2008. It is unknown why information about the pathogen declined; it is 
perhaps an area for further research. In addition, the frequency of messages 
describing the type of product recalled experienced a sharp dip in the last three 
years of the study. In 2003, 92.9 percent of the articles described the type of recalled 
product. In 2008, those messages were found in only 37.7 percent of the stories.  
Messages regarding how to control the threat were fairly consistent across all 
six years, with only a slight decline in the percentage of articles containing these 
messages in 2005. An individual evaluation of the types of messages under this 
category shows that the frequency of information on how much of the recalled 
product has been accounted for increased from 2006 to 2008. The number of 
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messages on how to report illnesses was higher in 2003 than in any other year, but 
still only slightly noticeable at 14.3 percent. 
Similar to the second category of messages, messages on how to safeguard 
against further threats were mentioned less frequently in 2005. In general, these 
types of messages were less prevalent than the other two message categories. 
However, in 2007, messages regarding changes to regulations that aim to prevent 
future outbreaks rose considerably. This is perhaps because in 2007, the number of 
recalls and the total pounds recalled were significantly higher than the previous four 
years. Politicians and government regulators perceived a need to call for changes to 
the recall system, the inspection mechanism, and governmental authority to maintain 
the integrity of the food supply. In addition to a rise in beef recalls in 2007, there 
were instances of other pathogen-related food recalls that could have contributed to 
the need for change. The frequency of messages ensuring the safety of the beef 
supply rose in 2008 due to Secretary Shafer’s presence as an important source 
during one particular recall described above.  
In summary, the content analysis of the newspaper reports immediately 
following the 36 individual E. coli-contaminated beef recalls during the six years of 
this study discloses an adequate approach to crisis communication during these 
periods of public health emergency. The media relied on two primary stakeholders, 
government agencies and the companies who processed or sold the contaminated 
meat product, as their primary sources of information. The most frequent category of 
messages communicated was those that informed the public about the crisis or 
threat. These messages regarding the state and magnitude of the crisis event are 
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essential to effective crisis communication. Messages that inform the public how to 
control or manage the risk, especially those that relate to symptoms and illnesses 
associated with E. coli, were also found in the coverage at a significant level. These 
messages of self-efficacy enable the public to have control over the crisis situation 
and reduce the level of perceived risk. The two categories of messages that are 
lacking in the coverage are those that communicate measures to safeguard against 
future threats and messages that indicate the crisis has ended.  
An analysis of the messages communicated over the six years reveal only 
moderate to slight consistency of messages over time. Communicating consistent 
messages, especially when dealing with the same type of public health emergency, 
can reduce confusion, alleviate panic, and aid in reducing the magnitude of 
perceived risk.  
The findings show that the media are the direct links and institutional 
mechanisms for communication among the health, the veterinary and beef, and the 
public sectors. The findings indicate that the accessibility and availability of major 
stakeholders to the media and the resulting messages that were communicated to 
the public led to an overall attenuation of the risks involved in these crises situations. 
The results suggest ways of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of handling a 
public health emergency. The findings also suggest areas to consider for 
improvement in communicating with different audience segments regarding crises of 
this type. These findings will be explained in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined crisis communication following recalls of beef products 
as a result of the pathogen E. coli O157:H7. One objective of the study was to 
determine the sources journalists turn to during public health emergencies of this 
type. To do so, the study analyzed the information items in newspaper coverage of 
beef recalls that aimed at informing the public about the threat, how to control or 
manage the risk, measures to safeguard against future threats, and an indication 
that the crisis has ended. An assessment of the coverage was conducted over a six-
year time span. A content analysis of newspaper reports within 30 days of the 
announcement of an E. coli-related beef recall was done to answer six research 
questions. A total of 452 newspaper reports were analyzed representing 36 recalls 
officially issued from 2003 through 2008.  
In the past six years, these crisis situations have received sporadic coverage, 
at times moderate and in other years relatively small, with the exception of three 
special cases that attracted heavy media attention. The majority of the sources cited 
were from two of the major stakeholders during these crisis situations, government 
agencies and meat sellers. Other sources that play a small but perhaps important 
role in the coverage of these recalls were lawyers and elected officials. Beef industry 
organizations, an important stakeholder, were rarely cited as information sources, 
suggesting that they do not constitute an important category of information sources 
for reporters and journalists. Their lack of influence in the public discussions of this 
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important topic indicates a major void in their communication efforts, one that needs 
to be addressed if they intend to demonstrate leadership in this regard.         
The information the public needs to know regarding the type, condition, and 
stage of the threat were well communicated. Messages intended to enhance 
consumers’ self-efficacy so that they are aware of how to control or manage the 
threat were less common in the coverage. Measures to remedy and control future 
threats were scant. So were bulletins that inform the public that the threat is over. 
An overwhelming majority of the newspaper reports included messages 
regarding specific information about the recall, including the number of pounds 
recalled, the names of companies recalling the product, product descriptions, and 
processing dates. The primary sources of these messages were the USDA and the 
meat companies linked to producing or selling the contaminated product. The 
second category of messages, informing how to control or manage the threat, 
primarily constituted information about the symptoms of E. coli O157:H7 and the 
cases of illness or death associated with the recall. Self-efficacy messages, such as 
safe food preparation practices, what to do with recalled product, and company 
contact information were found in about one-third of the reports. Of the messages 
about measures to safeguard against future threat, information on how the 
contamination was discovered was prominent, but measures that have been taken 
to assure the safety of the beef supply and actions the industry has taken to prevent 
future outbreaks were rarely communicated to the public.  
The fifth research question asks what messages indicate that the crisis has 
ended. The findings reveal that the public is almost never informed that the current 
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threat or recall has ended. Over the six-year span of this study, there has not been a 
high degree of consistency in the messages communicated to the public on this 
regard.  
The social amplification of risk framework states that the quality and quantity 
of information audiences receive can attenuate or amplify public perception of a risk 
situation (Kasperson et al., 1988). In the case of newspaper reports of beef recalls 
due to E. coli contamination from 2003 to 2008, the quality and quantity of 
information communicated to the public can be considered high. While the impact of 
these recalls are still under review, it can be concluded that the type of media 
coverage, the sources used, and the messages communicated led to the attenuation 
of risks associated with beef recalls.  
Quality risk communication reports need to adequately notify the public about 
potential threats and educate them of the hazards. Slovic (1986) identifies several 
criteria reporters should consider when analyzing and communicating risk, which 
can be used to evaluate the messages communicated in this study. In the case of 
the risk information about the dangers of E. coli-contaminated beef, it is clear that 
reporters incorporated sufficient risk analysis information.  
The probability and magnitude of the risk or harm is conveyed when reporters 
include information on the number of pounds recalled, the list companies identified 
as having distributed the contaminated products, and the affected geographic areas. 
This last information item is crucial because knowing where the contaminated meat 
was sold provides a clear sense of the areas and the population groups that who 
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bear a higher risk burden. As found in this study, these types of messages are 
prevalent in the coverage.  
In his criteria for risk analysis, Slovic (1986) maintains that risk reporting 
should also include an element of the probability of harm and potential number of 
people exposed. While it is difficult to predict how many people will suffer from 
consuming E. coli-contaminated beef, the coverage does include, at a high 
frequency, messages regarding the number of known cases of illness or death 
connected to the recall. These messages, moreover, tell the public of what types of 
individuals have a greater sensitivity to the contamination and identify that with 
elevated risks. Found at a low frequency, however, were information on safe food 
preparation procedures and other steps public can take if they purchased the 
recalled product. More information of this type will not only help alleviate risk but also 
provide enduring knowledge people can use should instances like these occur again 
in the future.  
A complete evaluation of risk and crisis communication effectiveness should 
include both the messages communicated and an element of audience 
understanding (Slovic, 1986; Weinstein and Sandman, 1993). While this study deals 
with only the first component, the results indicate that evaluating the communicated 
messages in terms of the extent to which they develop a public that is aware and 
knowledgeable of measures they can take is critical in ascertaining the quality of 
crisis communication efforts beyond the number of warning bulletins issued.  
Communicating adverse consequences, such as the symptoms of illnesses 
associated with E. coli contamination and the cases of illness or death associated 
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with it enhances public understanding of risk. While this risk information may be 
frightening to some, those who are more susceptible or vulnerable are given fair 
warning and taught how to take preventive measures. Furthermore, providing 
technical information about the pathogen and how contamination can occur are 
important elements that go a long way toward safeguarding public health (Sandman, 
2003; Reynolds and Seeger, 2005). The lack of technical information about E. coli, 
especially in the later years of the study when beef recalls were greater in number 
and severity, can lead to unwarranted public panic. 
 The findings reveal that messages regarding how to control or manage the 
threat are few and far between, suggesting an area for improvement in risk 
communication efforts. Information on safe food handling techniques, what to do 
with the recalled product, and where to turn to for more information can reduce harm 
and restore a degree of control over the situation. 
Also in need of improvement are messages that can reduce the adverse 
effects of the crisis on public opinion and trust and, consequently, on business 
returns. A study conducted at Kansas State University in cooperation with the 
Cattlemen’s Beef Board found that food safety recalls negatively effect domestic 
beef demand (Mintert, et. al., 2009). This study concluded that the more than two-
fold increase in beef recalls from 2006 to 2007 is associated with a 2.6 percent 
decline in retail beef demand. Assuring the public that either government or industry 
are perpetually vigilant and are prepared to take measures to limit future threats will 
help the public maintain trust in these sectors’ capabilities to regulate food 
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processing and distribution. This will aid considerably in maintaining the industry’s 
integrity as purveyors of safe food products.      
Over all, the findings indicate the importance of maintaining a healthy 
relationship between the food industry and the media, especially during instances 
that threaten public health and well-being. They suggest that public perception of the 
safety of a food item is a continuous, and not a categorical, variable. A comparison 
of the magnitude of information richness of coverage regarding a single but 
persistent threat over time provided more valid and reliable results than a case study 
of one or different types of crises would have produced. Crisis communicators can 
draw from these findings the journalistic practices that safeguard public health when 
contaminated food products are inadvertently released in the market. For producers, 
distributors, wholesalers, retailers and those hired to represent them during a recall, 
the value of evaluating risk communication activities lie in its ability to assist in 
reducing immediate revenue losses and the potential of losing future market shares.   
The findings of this type of research may also be applied in other highly 
threatening conditions, especially in the face of growing concern for the malicious 
use of plant or animal pathogens to cause devastating diseases in the agricultural 
sector. This perception of increased risk stems from recent natural outbreaks like 
foot-and-mouth and the spread of the West Nile virus in the eastern United States.  
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study has a number of limitations. First, not all newspapers published in 
the US are archived in the Lexis-Nexis database, which calls into question the 
generalizability of the findings to the entire population of US newspapers. This 
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limitation also implies that the journalistic practices that produced these reports may 
be limited to newspapers with considerable regional and national circulation. How 
smaller community newspapers respond to these incidents is therefore an area that 
demand future research attention.   
Second, three special recall cases generated a large number of newspaper 
reports to warrant the employment of random sampling techniques. A complete 
enumeration of newspaper reports during these unusual recall events may produce 
different results. 
Third, the news reports analyzed were limited only to those that saw print or 
were present in the online version of newspapers. The broadcast media, which are 
often the first to issue alerts concerning other crisis situations such as natural 
disasters, were not included in this analysis. Considering that many consumers 
depend on them, especially for breaking news, assessing the performance of radio 
and television in handling these risk events should be an important part of the risk 
communication research agenda. Indeed risk managers and risk communication 
practitioners will benefit from future studies along these lines that examine the 
performance of different media, such as television, radio and online outlets.  
Future research in the area of media coverage of beef recalls could involve a 
case study analysis of the more significant recalls. This type of individual evaluation 
of all newspaper coverage beyond the initial recall announcement could analyze the 
dynamics within the recall in terms of sources cited and intensity of coverage.   
Content analysis methods can be triangulated with public opinion surveys to 
determine audience effects in terms of knowledge, attitudes and behavior. A 
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longitudinal look at trends and changes in public perception will also be helpful in 
predicting potential consequences in terms of public reaction and government or 
regulatory body response. Such audience-oriented methods will offer deeper 
insights about the extent to which crisis communication efforts were effective in 
mitigating risks and in reducing the harm contaminated beef pose to public health.     
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APPENDIX A 
Coding Sheet for Content Analysis of Newspaper Articles  
Variable Name Variable Label Values 
ID Individual story ID 
(numbered 
consecutively) 
 
 
Coder Coder’s initials  
Paper Newspaper name Enter as a string variable 
Type Categorization of 
story 
1 = straight news 
2 = feature article 
3 = editorial  
4 = letter to editor 
5 = press release 
 
Origin Determine origin of 
story 
1 = Story written by newspaper reporter or staff 
member 
2 = Story from wire service 
3 = Reader’s response or letters 
4 = other 
5 = not specified 
 
Headline The headline of the 
story 
 
Enter as a string variable 
Date Date of story 
publication 
Enter as month, day, year  
(mm-dd-yyyy) 
 
Length Length of story  Number of words in the story 
Source1 Name of first source 
cited 
 
Enter as string variable 
Title1 Title/status of first 
source 
 
Enter as string variable 
Agency1 Agency affiliation of 
first source 
 
Enter as string variable 
 
Cat1 Category of first 
source 
1 = Scientists from universities and research 
institutions 
2 = Governmental scientists 
3 = Other scientists 
4 = Scientific journals and their editors 
5 = Meat packers, retailers, wholesalers 
6 = Ordinary citizens and consumers, but not 
farmers 
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7 = Advocacy groups 
8 = International not-for-profit group 
9 = Government agencies, employees, but not 
government scientist 
10 = Industry organizations  
11 = Beef organizations 
12 = Politicians, elected officials 
13 = Other  
 
Source2 Name of second 
source cited 
 
Code as in Source 1 
Title2 Title/status of second 
source 
 
Code as in Title 1 
Agency2 Agency affiliation of 
first source 
 
Code as in Affiliation 1 
Cat2 Category of second 
source 
1 = Scientists from universities and research 
institutions 
2 = Governmental scientists 
3 = Other scientists 
4 = Scientific journals and their editors 
5 = Meat packers, retailers, wholesalers 
6 = Ordinary citizens and consumers, but not 
farmers 
7 = Advocacy groups 
8 = International not-for-profit group 
9 = Government agencies, employees, but not 
government scientist 
10 = Industry organizations  
11 = Beef organizations 
12 = Politicians, elected officials 
13 = Other 
 
Source3 Name of third source 
cited 
 
Code as in Source 1 
Title3 Title/status of third 
source cited 
 
Code as in Title 1 
Agency3 Agency affiliation of 
first source 
 
Code as in Affiliation 1 
Cat3  Category of third 
source 
1 = Scientists from universities and research 
institutions 
2 = Governmental scientists 
3 = Other scientists 
4 = Scientific journals and their editors 
5 = Meat packers, retailers, wholesalers 
6 = Ordinary citizens and consumers, but not 
farmers 
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7 = Advocacy groups 
8 = International not-for-profit group 
9 = Government agencies, employees, but not 
government scientist 
10 = Industry organizations  
11 = Beef organizations 
12 = Politicians, elected officials 
13 = Other 
 
Source4 Name of fourth 
source cited 
 
Code as in Source 1 
Title4 Title/status of fourth 
source cited 
 
Code as in Title 1 
Agency4 Agency affiliation of 
first source 
 
Code as in Affiliation 1 
Cat4 Category of fourth 
source 
1 = Scientists from universities and research 
institutions 
2 = Governmental scientists 
3 = Other scientists 
4 = Scientific journals and their editors 
5 = Meat packers, retailers, wholesalers 
6 = Ordinary citizens and consumers, but not 
farmers 
7 = Advocacy groups 
8 = International not-for-profit group 
9 = Government agencies, employees, but not 
government scientist 
10 = Industry organizations  
11 = Beef organizations 
12 = Politicians, elected officials 
13 = Other 
 
Source5 Name of fifth source 
cited 
 
Code as in Source 1 
Title5 Title/status of fifth 
source cited 
 
Code as in Title 1 
Agency5 Agency affiliation of 
fifth source 
 
Code as in Affiliation 1 
Cat5 Category of fifth 
source 
1 = Scientists from universities and research 
institutions 
2 = Governmental scientists 
3 = Other scientists 
4 = Scientific journals and their editors 
5 = Meat packers, retailers, wholesalers 
6 = Ordinary citizens and consumers, but not 
farmers 
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7 = Advocacy groups 
8 = International not-for-profit group 
9 = Government agencies, employees, but not 
government scientist 
10 = Industry organizations 
11 = Beef organizations 
12 = Politicians, elected officials 
13 = Other 
 
Source Total number of 
sources in the story 
 
Enter total number 
Message 1 Messages informing 
consumers about 
threat 
0 = not present 
1 = history of recalls 
2 = pounds recalled 
3 = name of company or companies involved in 
recall 
4 = type of product recalled (product codes, 
description of product) 
5 = date recall announced 
6 = dates product processed or distributed (sell-by 
dates, processed-on dates) 
7 = where product was distributed, affected states 
8 = information about the pathogen (bacteria, 
causes food-borne illness, science based info) 
 
Message 2 Messages informing 
how to control or 
manage the threat 
0 = not present 
1 = safe food preparation 
2 = illnesses and symptoms of E. coli; number of 
people sick or dead 
3 = what to do if purchased recalled product 
4 = how much of the product has been 
returned/accounted for 
5 = how to report cases of illnesses 
6 = contact information for companies/agencies 
where consumers can get information 
 
Message 3 Messages about 
what is being done to 
safeguard  
0 = not present 
1 = how contamination was discovered 
2 = insurance that the beef supply is safe 
3 = changes to governmental regulation preventing 
future outbreaks 
4 = attempts from beef industry preventing future 
outbreaks 
 
Message 4 Messages that the 
recall or threat has 
ended 
0 = not present 
1 = threat or recall has ended 
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More detailed descriptions of source categories:  
1 = Scientists from universities and university-based research institutions (scientists from a 
university with a food safety program); 
2 = Governmental scientists (e.g., scientists from the Food and Drug Administration, Centers for 
Disease Control, or United States Department of Agriculture; Federal or State); 
3 = Other scientists (scientists from institutions other than those mentioned above); 
4 = Scientific journals and journal editors; 
5 = Meat packers, wholesalers, retailers (any meat company where the product may have been 
produced or sold); 
6 = Ordinary citizens and consumers, but not farmers (e.g., individual consumers, restaurant 
personnel); 
7 = Advocacy groups (e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Humane Society of 
America); 
8 = International not-for-profit groups; 
9 = Government agencies, employees, but not government scientist (e.g., USDA, FSIS, CDC, 
Federal or State, spokesperson for government agency-not a scientist); 
10 = Industry organizations (e.g., American Meat Institute);  
11 = Beef representatives (e.g., National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, State Beef Associations, 
Cattlemen’s Beef Board, State Beef Councils); 
12 = Politicians and elected officials (e.g. Senators, Representatives) 
13 = Other (all other sources not listed above, including religious leaders, websites, surveys and 
public opinion polls, lawyers). 
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More detailed descriptions of messages: 
Messages informing consumers about the threat  
 0 = not present 
 1 = history of recalls 
 2 = pounds recalled 
 3 = name of company or companies involved in recall 
 4 = type of product recalled (product codes, description of product) 
 5 = date recall announced 
 6 = dates product processed or distributed (sell-by dates, processed-on dates) 
 7 = where product was distributed, affected states 
 8 = information about the pathogen (i.e. bacteria, causes food-borne illness,  
 science based info) 
  
Messages informing how to control or manage the threat 
 0 = not present 
 1 = safe food preparation 
 2 = illnesses and symptoms of E. coli; number of people sick or dead 
 3 = what to do if purchased recalled product; check if purchased product 
 4 = how much of the product has been returned/accounted for 
 5 = how to report cases of illnesses 
 6 = contact information for companies/agencies where consumers can get  
 more information 
  
 
Messages that indicate what measures are being done to safeguard against further contamination or 
outbreaks  
 0 = not present 
 1 = how contamination was discovered 
 2 = insurance that the beef supply is safe 
 3 = changes to governmental regulation or production practices preventing  
 future outbreaks 
 4 = attempts from beef industry preventing future outbreaks 
  
Messages informing consumers that the threat or recall has ended 
 0 = not present 
 1 = threat or recall has ended 
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APPENDIX B 
E. coli O157:H7 Model Press Release (with example) 
 
Accessed from: ORA/Office of Enforcement 
Division of Compliance Management and Operations 
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/recalls/ecoli.htm  
 
 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                                 DATE 
COMPANY CONTACT AND PHONE NUMBER 
 
FOOD CO. RECALLS PRODUCT BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE HEALTH RISK 
 
Company Name of City, State is recalling Quantity and/or Type of Product because 
it may be contaminated with Escherichia coli O157:H7 bacteria (E. Coli O157:H7). E. 
coli O157:H7 causes a diarrheal illness often with bloody stools. Although most 
healthy adults can recover completely within a week, some people can develop a 
form of kidney failure called Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS). HUS is most likely 
to occur in young children and the elderly. The condition can lead to serious kidney 
damage and even death. 
 
Product was distributed Listing of states and areas where the product was 
distributed and how it reached consumers (e.g., through retail stores, mail order, 
direct delivery). 
 
Specific information on how the product can be identified (e.g., type of container 
[plastic/metal/glass], size or appearance of product, product brand name, flavor, 
codes, expiration dates, etc.). 
 
Status of the number of and types of related illnesses that have been CONFIRMED 
to date (e.g., "No illnesses have been reported to date." 
 
Brief explanation about what is known about the problem, such as how it was 
revealed, and what is known about its source. An example of such a description -- 
"the recall was initiated after it was discovered that product was contaminated with 
E. coli O157:H7. Subsequent investigation indicates the problem was caused by a 
temporary breakdown in the company's production and packaging processes." 
 
Information on what consumers should do with the product and where they can get 
additional information (e.g., "consumers who have purchased Brand X are urged to 
return it to the place of purchase for a full refund. Consumers with questions may 
contact the company at 1-800-XXX-XXXX.) 
 
#### 
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(SAMPLE PRESS RELEASE) 
 
XYZ Inc. 
123 Smith Lane 
Anywhere, MS 
 
 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                                 DATE 
Sam Smith /555-555-5555 
 
 
XYZ RECALLS "SNACKIES" BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE HEALTH RISK 
 
 
XYZ Inc. of Anywhere, MS, is recalling its 5 ounce packages of "Snackies" food 
treats because they have the potential to be contaminated with Escherichia coli 
O157:H7. E. coli O157:H7 causes a diarrheal illness often with bloody stools. 
Although most healthy adults can recover completely within a week, some people 
can develop a form of kidney failure called Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS). HUS 
is most likely to occur in young children and the elderly; the condition can lead to 
serious kidney damage and even death. 
 
The recalled "Snackies" were distributed nationwide in retail stores and through mail 
orders. 
 
The product comes in a 5 ounce, clear plastic package marked with lot # 666666 on 
the top and with an expiration date of 12/12/99 stamped on the side. 
 
No illnesses have been reported to date in connection with this problem. 
 
The potential for contamination was noted after routine testing by the company 
detected the presence of E. coli O157:H7. 
 
Production of the product has been suspended while FDA and the company 
continue their investigation as to the cause of the problem. 
 
Consumers who have purchased 5 ounce packages of "Snackies" are urged to 
return them to the place of purchase for a full refund. Consumers with questions may 
contact the company at 1-800-XXX-XXXX. 
 
#### 
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